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The Shifting Geography of Competitive Advantage:  
Clusters, Networks and Firms 
 
Abstract 
We consider the dynamics of knowledge-based sources of advantage as they move between 
geographical locations and multinational and other firm level networks using the specialist 
context of Formula 1 motor over a fifty nine year period. We suggest that shifts in 
competitive advantage are underpinned by the movement of both architectural and component 
knowledge at both the firm and cluster level, and in particular we suggest that isolated firms 
can both benefit from and add to cluster level knowledge. We conclude by suggesting ways in 
which MNEs can adapt their approach to both location and knowledge development in order 
to enhance their ability to create competitive advantage. 
 
Keywords 
Clusters, competitive advantage, networks, knowledge flows, Formula 1. 
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1. Introduction 
 
An important development in the study of multinational firms and knowledge-based 
competitive advantage in recent years is the recognition that unique, rent-generating 
knowledge can be found in many locations around the globe.  No longer are multinational 
firms assumed to be interested in foreign locations only as potential markets for goods and 
services embodying knowledge developed in the home country; rather, they are explicitly 
found to use these locations as sources of innovative knowledge (Tallman and Fladmoe-
Lindquist, 2002).  If such knowledge can be absorbed by the multinational through a local 
subsidiary or joint venture operation and then transmitted to the rest of the firm for 
combination with knowledge from yet other locations (Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000), the 
multinational firm can create the kind of idiosyncratic firm-specific capabilities that generate 
sustained competitive advantage (Mudambi and Navarra, 2004). Further, this specialized 
knowledge is no longer seen as widely available throughout host nations, but rather as 
concentrated in specialized city-regions, industrial districts, or geographical clusters (Porter, 
1998).   
 This study uses the concepts of architectural and component knowledge (Matusik and 
Hill, 1998; Tallman, Jenkins, Henry and Pinch, 2004) to examine the movement of 
knowledge within and between firms in such geographical industry clusters in order to 
improve our understanding of how multinational firms can access, internalize, and 
reconfigure sticky, location-tied knowledge into unique firm-specific capabilities. Previous 
work has suggested that clusters or proximate networks of firms can offer sources of sustained 
competitive advantage to the firms (including the subsidiaries of multinational firms) residing 
within them (Porter, 1998; Pinch, Henry, Jenkins and Tallman, 2003). In this study we 
consider further the dynamics of knowledge based sources of competitive advantage both 
among firms within geographical clusters and between firms and groups of firms in different 
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locations. To do so, we focus on the technological innovations and the relative competitive 
advantage of clusters and cluster-based firms using the specialized context of Formula 1 (F1) 
motor racing over a fifty-nine year period between 1950 and 2008. We use a guided inductive 
approach by considering a series of propositions to interrogate longitudinal case study data. 
We observe both the emergence and transitions over time of clusters and of firm-level inter-
cluster networks and are able to consider how such shifts enable the creation of new forms of 
knowledge which lead to competitive advantage.    
2. The Geography of Knowledge and Competitive Advantage 
The concept that regionally-tied advantage might arise from a combination of unique 
knowledge assets is the basis for a variety of models of industrial districts or clusters in 
economic geography (Saxenian, 1994; Maskell 2001) and strategic management (Porter, 
1998; Tallman et al, 2004). While the application of cluster concepts to technology-intensive 
industries is evolving, most models assume that core knowledge is sticky – tightly bound to 
its originating location – leading to sustainable competitive advantage for firms within a 
cluster (Lawson, 1997). Other work proposes that isomorphic pressures will lead to 
knowledge convergence among the firms in a region leading to a tendency for the focus of 
innovation to narrow over time, thereby resulting in a move away from more radical 
breakthrough innovations (Damanpour, 1991). Location-based determinism for the 
knowledge attributed to a particular region makes change appear to be at best difficult and at 
worst impossible, such that embedded regional sources of advantage become sources of 
disadvantage over time as the regions, and likewise the firms within them, are unable to 
respond to change (Pouder and St. John, 1996).  
 We propose, though, that the knowledge base in any cluster can evolve through 
innovation, rather than stagnate or lose value through inter-regional imitation. One way in 
which the capabilities found in clusters evolve is through spillovers and re-combination of 
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ideas to stimulate development among firms within the regional cluster. Another possibility is 
the migration of knowledge from one location to others, often through active intervention by 
multinational firms. While differences in knowledge stocks may act as isolating mechanisms 
to slow knowledge flows between regions (Pinch et al., 2003), these geographical clusters of 
companies are not, in fact, completely isolated, and knowledge flows between regions within 
an industry play key roles in the evolution of industry knowledge stocks and the shift over 
time of competitive advantage. 
2.1. Defining Knowledge Types 
Tallman et al. (2004) consider knowledge development at both the firm and the cluster level 
using the notion of component and architectural knowledge (Henderson and Clark, 1990; 
Matusik and Hill, 1998). They propose that these two distinctive types of knowledge have 
both firm-specific and cluster-specific effects.  Architectural knowledge in particular is seen 
to be highly path-dependent and immobile, and therefore limited in flow across firm or cluster 
boundaries (Tallman et al., 2004). Component knowledge flows are enhanced within a firm or 
cluster by common cluster-level architectural knowledge, while different – often competing – 
sets of architectural knowledge between organizations or clusters act as isolating mechanisms 
to slow the movement of component knowledge across boundaries (Pinch et al., 2003).  
 Component knowledge consists of those specific knowledge resources, skills, and 
technologies that relate to the component parts of an organizational system rather than to the 
whole (Tallman et al., 2004).  Component knowledge is tied normally to the technology of the 
industry and is relatively coherent and definable rather than personal or historical, and 
therefore is potentially transferable to informed individuals and organizations, who will find it 
understandable once presented to them (McGaughey, 2002).  However, not all component 
knowledge is equally easy to absorb, even for firms in similar situations, as it may run from 
the simple and explicit to the fairly complex and tacit. 
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 Architectural knowledge relates to an entire system of knowledge and the structures and 
routines for integrating its component knowledge into patterns for productive use and for 
developing new knowledge (Matusik & Hill, 1998; McGaughey, 2002; Tallman et al., 2004).  
Not only is architectural knowledge typically complex and intangible, or tacit; it is also highly 
organization-specific and private due to its path-dependency, organizational embeddedness, 
and evolutionary nature, spillovers of firm-specific architectural knowledge are therefore not 
readily accessible by other firms (Matusik & Hill, 1998).  However, Tallman et al. (2004) 
propose that architectural knowledge develops also among the firms in a cluster, due to their 
close competitive, cooperative, and social interactions. They suggest that possessing 
such’quasi-private to cluster members’ knowledge delineates membership of a cluster and 
supports commonality of local knowledge by improving the absorptive capacities of cluster-
member firms for each others’ component knowledge.  
 Architectural knowledge may not be readily transferable, but this does not mean that it 
has no effect on the flow of knowledge.  Similar architectural knowledge derived from similar 
conditions and activities improves the absorptive capacity of a firm for component knowledge 
developed in a similar firm (Tallman et al., 2004). In Saxenian’s (1994) comparison of the 
Silicon Valley and Rte. 128 clusters in semiconductors, the architecture of the regional 
cultures was highly determinate of the ability of member firms to share technical knowhow. 
Henderson and Clark (1990) show that firms may be unable to grasp the competitive essence 
of new technical advances because of their own preconceptions about the architecture of the 
system, so movement of component knowledge between firms and clusters can also be limited 
by differences in architectural knowledge. 
 We propose that changes in knowledge stocks create new forms of knowledge and new 
resource configurations in both firms and clusters of firms.  We specifically challenge the idea 
that architectural knowledge is immobile. Rather, firms can gain access to alternative 
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architectures through foreign direct investment, either by locating in a cluster or by acquiring 
a unit that is engaged in a foreign cluster and ‘bringing it home’. By doing so, multinational 
firms can significantly alter their own architectural understandings and access foreign 
component knowledge efficiently. 
3. The Initial Model and Key Propositions 
The concept of the cluster is based on the premise that firms which are located within a 
cluster have key similarities and are able to use these to achieve a greater level of competitive 
performance than those which are not (Porter, 1998). For instance, Saxenian’s (1994) 
comparative study of the firms in Silicon Valley underlined how the fertile context of a 
restricted district (cluster) can provide competitive advantage, particularly in terms of the 
growth rates of the firms within one region as compared to another. These are underpinned by 
the notion that such clusters contain both passive and active collective efficiencies (Bell et al 
2009). Passive efficiencies are those set out by Marshall (1920) and include aspects such as 
reduced transportation and specialized labor pools. Active collective efficiencies are related to 
the availability of knowledge and other valuable intangible resources to which member firms 
actively seek access (Iammarino and McCann, 2006).  
P1: Firms within a cluster will outperform firms that are outside. 
 However, the notion that knowledge and performance are solely and wholly bounded by 
geographic limits is clearly over-simplistic. Technology-focused clusters, or “new industrial 
districts” (Piore and Sabel, 1986), are not closed systems, but are dependent on external 
knowledge flows, often through the internal networks of multinational firms, to maintain and 
enhance their potency (Lawson, 1997). The literature of multinational investment suggests 
that multinational firms invest in clusters to access locally sticky knowledge (Mudambi, 
2008). Networks of alliances have been shown to exist within clusters and to differentiate 
knowledge sharing activities (Markusen, 1999; Tallman and Jenkins, 2002), and 
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geographically dispersed inter-firm networks are particularly influential in spreading 
knowledge and in explaining firm level performance (Mowery, Oxley and Silverman, 1996).  
P2: Knowledge-based clusters are characterized by strong intra-regional connections 
and also by connections to external, even international, knowledge sources and partners. 
 The economic geography literature tends to focus on the formation of clusters, which 
are seen as emergent and firms simply find themselves benefitting from such agglomerations 
without necessarily making deliberate attempts to exploit such potential (Piore and Sabel, 
1986). Clusters in specific industries develop in specific locations based on historic factors 
and on the advantages of co-location for competitors in those industries (Zucker, Darby and 
Armstrong, 1998; Tallman and Phene, 2007). However, firms do not only develop within 
clusters, they also make strategic decisions to become participants. The international strategy 
literature has made much of the locational strategies of multinational firms and the 
implications of these choices for firm performance. Off-shore sourcing of both goods and 
knowledge development further emphasizes the importance of location-based comparative 
advantage, conceived in a narrow and precise manner, as the basis for competitive advantage 
among multinational firms (Mudambi, 2008; Doh, Buyaratavej and Hahn, 2008).  
P3: Multinational firms proactively implement strategies to take competitive advantage 
of location-tied knowledge competencies in choosing to locate in specific clusters. 
 Studies in the area of alliances and knowledge suggest that knowledge flows more 
effectively within company structures and also between formal alliance partners, even within 
a cluster, as opposed to between informal partners or different organisations in the same 
industry with no formal linkages (Gomes-Casseres, Hagedoorn & Jaffe, 2006; Almeida and 
Kogut, 1999). Studies of multinational firms provide considerable evidence that knowledge 
flows more easily within firm boundaries when moving across geographical distances or 
crossing national borders, as internalization by a firm reduces both fears of opportunistic 
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behaviour in partners and improves joint understanding for more tacit knowledge (Gupta and 
Govindarajan, 2000). This contrasts with the rather more passive construct of spillovers of 
information within informal social networks that often characterizes work targeted at 
knowledge flows within geographically defined areas (Storper, 1995). 
P4: Knowledge flows will be greater between formal partners and within multinational 
firm structures than through informal relationships. 
 Although the idea that firms within a cluster operate in a homogenous manner often is 
inferred from work on the cluster level of analysis, there is also a wide range of literature that 
suggests that firms position and configure themselves in different ways within clusters. 
Maskell (2001) distinguishes vertical (supplier-buyer) cluster relationships with a primary 
cooperative basis from horizontal cluster relationships that have a primary competitive basis. 
Markussen’s (1999) idea of differing cluster structures underlines the potential variation in 
firm approaches, as does Tallman and Jenkins’ (2002) description of multiple internal 
networks within a single regional cluster. Tallman et al. (2004) further establish that firms 
within a cluster retain private, firm-specific, architectural knowledge even as they participate 
in the cluster-specific architecture.  
P5: Competing firms in the same industry, even the same cluster, will implement widely 
differing strategies to reconfigure core technologies in novel ways to build firm-specific 
advantage building on cluster-specific architectural knowledge. 
 To further understand the dynamics of capability-building at the level of geographical 
clusters we now look to the development and evolution of a particular form of motor sport – 
Formula 1 – which is unusual in being able to allow us to consider both firm and regional 
levels of competitive performance, and which has featured geographical concentration in the 
construction of the racing automobiles as a characteristic of the industry from its birth. 
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4. Refining the Model: The Geography of Competition in Formula 1 (F1) 
from 1950 to 2008 
Formula 1 provides a unique opportunity to explore the performance of relatively complex, 
performance driven organizations that design, manufacture and race their own cars in an 
annual series of globally dispersed races. F1 provides a unique balance of technology, capital, 
and human resources with an unequivocal performance outcome – winning races –  which 
makes it a particularly suitable sector for us to examine (Foxall and Johnston, 1991; Jenkins 
and Floyd, 2001; Jenkins, in press).  First, we are able to examine relative firm performance 
in international competition over extended periods and thereby to identify firm level 
competitive advantage. Second, we are able to tie location of activities to these performance 
outcomes and thereby concern the potential for cluster type effects. Third, the evidence of a 
horizontal cluster of firms in the south of the UK is well documented and thereby provides at 
least one possible example of the potency and dynamics and clusters. Finally, the wealth of 
data, much of it focusing on the turbulent context of technological development and 
innovation (Wright, 2001) allows us to consider the role of knowledge flows in the process of 
achieving competitive performance. 
4.1. Research Method and Data 
This study draws on an extensive research database which has been built up over the last ten 
years.  It was developed to focus on issues relating to competitive performance of individual 
teams, technological innovation and development and also the managerial and resourcing 
challenges of achieving and sustaining high performance. The database includes details of 
race performance from 1950 – 2008; inputs from several hundred specialist periodicals and 
other publications, books (including autobiographies of influential individuals) and over fifty 
interviews with key players in the industry conducted between 1999 and 2009, all of which 
have been recorded and transcribed.  
  11
 We describe our research approach as ‘guided induction’ as we use a series of a priori 
propositions to guide the way in which we have interrogated the database. This has involved 
breaking each proposition into a series of keywords and interrogating the database 
accordingly to identify relevant data sources that can be explored in more detail. In this 
particular study, we identified two in-depth interviews with individuals who were influential 
in different teams and different locations during this period. John Barnard was Technical 
Director of UK based McLaren (1981-1986) and Ferrari (1986-1990 & 1992-1996), Ross 
Brawn was Technical Director of UK based Benetton (1991 – 1996) and Ferrari (1997 – 
2006). Given their relevance to many of the questions we raise we have incorporated sections 
of these transcripts to illustrate the case study. This approach is an embedded case design 
(Scholz & Tietje, 2002; Yin, 2003), as we select and explore embedded case units that reflect 
particular episodes in the history of F1 during the period in question. 
 The process we have adopted first maps out the shifts in performance at the firm and 
regional level between 1950 and 2008.  This provides us with an overview of competitive 
performance during this time period. The data allow us to consider the issues related to the 
performance of firms and regions. In this case we have focused on race performance, this is 
the express objective of the F1 teams themselves and it also provides a close proxy to the 
economic success of individual firms, since financial rewards are derived directly from race 
performance. We use the concept of podium performance (the first, second and third cars to 
finish a race) as this is the most consistent way in which prize money has been allocated in the 
period 1950-2008 (Hotten, 1998).  
 Figures 1 & 2 provide an illustration of the location of F1 teams at two different points 
in time. Figure 1 illustrates the locations of the main Formula 1 teams at its beginning in 
1950. These are identified as ERA based in Dunstable, UK; Talbot-Darracq based near Paris, 
France and Maserati, Ferrari and Alfa Romeo all clustered around Modena in northern Italy. 
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INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 Figure 2 shows the distribution of F1 teams in 2008. Here we see a stronger presence in 
the UK, particularly in the area to the north, west and south of London. The Italian grouping, 
although diminished, remains, as does the presence of activity in both Germany (BMW 
engines in Munich and Toyota car and engines in Cologne) and France (Renault engines at 
Viry-Châtillon). 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
4.2. The Analysis 
In this section, we consider the five propositions developed in the literature discussion to 
provide a basis for reflecting on the technological development of F1 between 1950 and 2008 
and to use the rich data from the case to explore these questions. The study is not deductive, 
in that these guiding questions have simply helped to bound our data gathering and analysis 
rather than result in a specific test of the propositions. The output should therefore be seen as 
exploratory and explanatory rather than conclusive and definitive. We use the case study to 
further refine, rather than accept or reject, the initial propositions. At the end of each section 
we offer a reconsidered statement of the proposition based on our assessment of the evidence 
from the case of Formula 1 racing.  
4.2.1. Proposition 1 
The first issue that we examine is the potential existence of clusters within this specialised 
industry context in the period 1950 - 2008. Much has been written about the existence and 
development of the UK’s Motorsport Valley in terms of it being a particularly potent and 
influential cluster (Beck-Burridge & Walton, 2000; Henry & Pinch, 2002). We also consider 
the question as to whether or not clusters existed to the same extent in Italy, Germany and 
France.  
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INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 The data presented in Figure 3 raises two initial questions. First, how many clusters are 
in evidence, and second, what is the relative performance of the firms within the clusters? 
Cooke (1999) links Marshall’s concept of industrial districts to three elements: groupings of 
sub-contractors, readily available skilled labour and rapid formal and informal 
communication across firms and employees reflected by Marshall’s notion of ‘knowledge in 
the air’. We suggest that there in fact were two potential clusters in existence in the Formula 1 
industry between 1950 and 2008. The first was an emerging Italian cluster which is evident 
between 1950 and 1957 and which built on the notion of the ‘Land of Motors’ between 
Modena and Bologna and which was comprised of motorsports operations, specialist sports 
cars and motorbikes.  In his work on the region, Brusco (1986) notes how the performance of 
these small specialists is often not recognised in studies of regional economics as these tend to 
focus on higher overall levels of productivity and output. 
 There is evidence of both vertical and horizontal cluster-like activity relating to the 
motorsports activity in this region during this period – in particular related to the racing car 
design expertise which developed in Alfa Romeo and was then exploited by Ferrari and 
Lancia (Yates, 1991).  
 Many of the engineers that became famous in the region provided expertise that was 
utilised by many different companies. For example, Gian Paolo Dallara started his motorsport 
career at Maserati with Ramirez and then established the Lamborghini sports car operation 
before founding his own company, Dallara, which went on to become a successful single seat 
race car manufacturer (Henry et al, 2007). Further evidence of the ‘untraded 
interdependencies’ of this region of Northern Italy is provided by the technology which 
moved between Lancia and Ferrari, when Lancia decided to withdraw from F1 at the end of 
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1955, in an arrangement brokered by Fiat they allowed Ferrari to use the designs of their D50 
car in order to create the Ferrari D50 of 1956 (Yates, 1991). 
 If the nascent Italian motorsports cluster dominated F1 in the early 1950s, it soon 
evolved into a vertical cluster consisting of a supply network tied to a single team - Ferrari. In 
contrast, the second cluster emerged in the UK around the dominant Cooper team in the late 
1950s, and was taken forward by Lotus and others in the mid sixties, this grouping, known as 
Motorsport Valley (MSV), became characteristic of the archetypal horizontal cluster with 
differing firms coming to the fore in different periods. In particular Lotus dominated much of 
the 1960s and 1970s (Crombac, 1986); McLaren the 1980s (Henry, 1999) and Williams the 
1990s (Hamilton, 2009).  
  
 The statement in P1 is supported by much of the activity during the period when the 
clustered firms from the UK dominated the F1 races. However, we can observe particular 
periods when individual firms broke through and dominated the cluster firms. One of these is 
during the mid-1970s and the other in the period between 1999 and 2008. In this case we 
suggest the following phenomena occurred: 1) The Italian motorsport cluster began to 
develop in the early 1950s, but due to various environmental shifts failed to become truly 
dominant in a sustained way. The Italian motorsport cluster effectively transformed from a 
nascent multi-firm cluster into a single-firm centric vertical cluster (Markusen, 1999; Maskell, 
2001) based around Ferrari, but with a number of other F1 operations developing in the region 
such as Dallara, Minardi and Alfa Romeo. 2) The English cluster displayed the characteristics 
of a horizontal, or competitive, cluster and also demonstrated temporary phases of firm level 
success, but with consistent cluster domination from the period 1958 through 1973 and from 
1980 through to 1999. 3) The domination of Ferrari in particular periods suggests that at times 
the dominant-firm vertical network outperformed the broader horizontal cluster due to 
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asymmetries in knowledge firms between these regions. Knowledge flows from the UK to 
Ferrari, through both targeted hires and direct investment by Ferrari in the UK, allowed it to 
build up architectural knowledge in key technologies, but there is little evidence of reciprocal 
flows back to the UK cluster, supporting any competitive advantage Ferrari was able to 
develop during this period. 
 F1 shows that while as a group the competing firms located within a horizontal cluster 
dominated the industry, they were susceptible to competition from a vertical, or dominant-
firm, cluster in which one central firm was supported by a network of supplier firms and other 
organizational relationships (Maskell, 2001; Zucker et al., 1998). For multinational firms 
considering locations in which to seek knowledge, this presents both insight and warning – 
short term success may not represent long term competitive advantage nor long term superior 
knowledge production. 
Revised P1: The set of firms within a horizontal cluster generally will outperform 
external firms. However, when performance is considered at the firm level, 1) varying 
firms within a cluster will demonstrate competitive advantage at different times, and 2) 
external competing firms can gain advantage and out-perform firms located within a 
cluster for a period. 
 Thus, we find that firms appear to retain an important degree of distinctiveness within 
clusters, with the result that circulating component knowledge of technological innovations 
does not benefit all member firms equally.  However, the rapid spillover of such innovation 
suggests that competitive advantage resides with more deeply embedded capabilities, perhaps 
what Tallman et al. (2004) define as “firm specific architectural knowledge”, and describe as 
being unavailable to other cluster members. They propose a similar limitation on the 
movement of knowledge across cluster boundaries. However, from our evidence it does 
appear that externally located firms can tap the component knowledge of distant clusters, as 
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Ferrari did by using UK-based subcontractors, and combine such knowledge with their own 
distinctive competences to achieve superior performance. The lack of co-located competitors 
then permits these firms to sustain advantage longer than is typically the case for cluster-
embedded firms (Maskell, 2001). This suggests that multinational firms can indeed expect to 
benefit competitively from sourcing cluster-tied knowledge and combining it with other 
knowledge in remote locations, as proposed by Kogut and Zander (1992). 
4.2.2. Proposition 2 
We consider the performance results described above to be the consequence of knowledge 
flows both within and between clusters and external competitors. To demonstrate this, we first 
consider the nascent Italian cluster in the period 1950-1957. Here there is very little evidence 
of any international knowledge sources or partnerships beyond the cluster. It may be that such 
external linkages are likely to develop later in the evolution of a cluster rather than in the early 
stages. And indeed, we note later evidence of Ferrari accessing knowledge from Motorsport 
Valley in the UK through direct investment in a research facility. One of the first indications 
of this was that the first monocoque chassis that Ferrari used in 1972 actually was made for 
them by an English sub-contractor for the 312B3 (Yates, 1991). This was followed up later, 
when in 1986 Ferrari recruited Technical Director John Barnard to the team: 
“Ferrari was one of those teams that was fundamentally an engine company and the chassis 
was always second place and he [Enzo Ferrari] saw what was going on in the British side of 
Formula 1 with the introduction of composites and so on, so he wanted to lift the chassis side 
really.  He, through intermediaries, contacted me and the outcome was that I didn’t want to 
go to Italy but he wanted me so he said “Okay, do you want to set something up in England?” 
and given that opportunity I said “Yes”.  (John Barnard, Interview). 
 Ferrari were accessing very specific technologies (chassis design with the 312B3) and 
knowledge from Barnard and his team of composite materials and aerodynamics with the 
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GTO operation. However these were temporary phenomena, and once this knowledge had 
been absorbed, the operations were moved back to Italy:  
“Montezemolo [President of Ferrari] had decided that Ferrari wasn’t being pulled together 
from both sides, the English end and the Italian end weren’t being pulled together so they got 
John Todt [New General Manager of the F1 operation] along and right from when he came in 
initially Todt basically said to me “Look I want it all back in Italy” (John Barnard, Interview) 
 In the evolution of the UK cluster, a different pattern of international linkages and 
knowledge flows is evident. First, many of the technologies used in the early Cooper cars of 
the 1950s came from outside the UK, such as the Fiat Topolino suspension components or the 
JAP motorcycle drive chain (Lawrence, 1998). However, once this technology was 
assimilated into the cars, there is no evidence of any further direct international knowledge 
inflows. 
 In the late 1970s, both Lotus and McLaren were exploring the use of carbon composite 
material to create an F1 chassis. Lotus had determined to use a ‘hand laid’ solution where the 
composite was laid by hand. McLaren’s John Barnard felt that a strong and lighter structure 
would be created by moulding rather than hand laying the carbon. He had tried to locate 
expertise in composites in the UK, but had been unsuccessful:  
 “I started thinking about this carbon thing and went to have a look round at British 
Aerospace in Weybridge and see what they were doing, (John Barnard, Interview) 
 Barnard had worked for a number of years in the US for the Chaparral racing team and 
utilized this network to locate an organization in the USA who would be able to help with the 
molding process: 
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“the next day we got on a plane with the model under our arm, put the model in the overhead 
rack, got on the plane with the drawings and we were both off to Salt Lake City and that was 
it, (John Barnard, Interview) 
 In this case we can detect international knowledge sourcing processes both of firms 
within a cluster looking outside (McLaren using the composite expertise in the US), and of 
isolated firms looking inside the cluster to access particular knowledge (Ferrari establishing a 
design operation in the UK). This suggests the following amended Proposition 2: 
Revised P2: Linkages within a cluster allow member firms to access knowledge and 
capabilities within the cluster.  However, external competitors seek specific technologies 
from clusters and cluster member firms and use international, networks to create at 
least temporary firm-specific competitive advantage. 
 One way in which clustered firms seem to distinguish themselves from co-located 
competitors in a horizontal cluster is by firm-specific external linkages (see also Tallman and 
Jenkins, 2002), often to multinational firms.  Such linkages develop firm-level architectural 
knowledge, and thereby provide technical component knowledge that may be less accessible 
to other cluster members than locally–developed technology.  The main focus of cluster-
oriented studies of knowledge (Pinch et al., 2003) is on the isolating effect of differential 
architectural knowledge. However, it appears that external firms can access component 
knowledge held in clusters through mechanisms such as alliances or contracts with cluster 
members that can circumvent ignorance of local architectural knowledge. The evidence 
suggests that Ferrari typically resisted such MSV-sourced knowledge until its benefits in 
racing became obvious, but would then engage key owners of the knowledge rather than 
trying to develop something similar on their own.  This insight suggests that multinational 
firms can indeed access even highly tacit knowledge through location in a geographical 
cluster if they are willing to engage closely with local suppliers and competitors. 
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4.2.3. Proposition 3  
When Honda, the Japanese multinational automobile firm, considered entering F1 in the early 
1960s, they went to Brabham, to Cooper and to Lotus to see if these British teams could build 
a chassis to take a new engine they had just completed.  Their original plan was to provide an 
engine for a British constructor to use, ultimately the plan didn’t work due to politics between 
the British Constructors and their engine suppliers, but Honda had a clear objective to utilise 
the expertise within this region: “Honda had begun thoroughly, sensibly and discreetly by 
asking advice from people who knew… Nakamura [Chief Engineer at Honda] and Crombac 
[French Journalist who had helped organise the Japanese Grand Prix in 1963] did not only 
visit Brabham. They went on to Cooper, then Lotus.” (Hilton, 1989: 15).   
 Ilmor was founded in January 1984 with the objective to build an engine for the North 
American Indy car series. They were able to secure backing from Roger Penske, a US racing 
team owner who the owners met while they were working for Cosworth. Penske’s Indy racing 
headquarters was based in Reading, Philadelphia, USA but they also had a chassis building 
operation based in Poole, Dorset, UK. Penske put up the initial capital for the project and in 
return received half of the shares in the business, he was then able to secure further funding 
from General Motors to badge the engine as a Chevrolet (Beck-Burridge & Walton, 2000; 
Couldwell, 2003). 
 In 1998 Mercedes badged Ilmor engines won the F1 constructors world championship 
with McLaren and the drivers’ championship for Mika Hakkinen. The reason why Mercedes 
Benz used Ilmor was summarized by Board member Jürgen Hubbert in 1996: “We could 
build an engine that would be powerful and strong. But the trouble would come when it took 
three hours to change the engine in the car! It’s not just about power. It’s how to build the 
engine, the dimensions, the weight, having the centre of gravity in the right place, and making 
it so an engine can be changed in forty-five minutes. Ilmor had the knowledge to bring these 
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things together and we had no doubt that this was the way forward for us.”. (Spreckley, 1999: 
146) 
 Towards the end of the 1990s, major shifts in ownership began to take place with car 
manufacturers taking major stakes in the MSV teams. Renault acquired the Benetton team in 
2001. DaimlerChrysler (Mercedes) had bought 40% of McLaren’s holding company and also 
a similar portion of their specialist engine supplier, Ilmor. Toyota made the decision to enter 
F1 from scratch from their motorsport base in Cologne, after spending a year developing their 
prototype car at the F1 circuits during 2001 and Honda entered in 2005 through the 
acquisition of the British American Racing (BAR) Team based at Brackley in the UK. All of 
these activities point towards an endorsement of Proposition 3 that firms, and particularly 
multinational firms, will choose to locate in clusters to access specific knowledge. There are 
of course exceptions to this. Toyota chose to deliberately locate outside the cluster in order to 
make use of their specialist motorsport facility located in Cologne – Team Toyota Europe or 
TTE. For many commentators this decision explained why their F1 activity had been 
relatively unsuccessful despite significant levels of investment (Jenkins et al 2009). BMW 
also followed a similar route when they prematurely ended a relationship to supply the 
Williams team with engines to make an acquisition of the Sauber team based in Hinwil, 
Switzerland as they regarded the potential for a closer cultural and geographic fit between 
BMW and Sauber than with Williams. 
 Revised P3: Multinational firms proactively implement strategies to access 
location-tied knowledge competencies by choosing to locate operations in specific 
clusters or alternatively by creating networks outside their home clusters. 
 F1 has offered situations where members of the horizontal MSV cluster reach out to 
suppliers from worldwide locations, and where companies from around the world reach into 
MSV for particular skills in building engines and chassis, an expertise in race car design that 
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is the basis for the existence of MSV.  Ferrari was able to overcome its architectural 
inclination to ignore British technological advances in the face of persistent losses, but further 
evidence suggests that the benefits of cluster-based competences in F1 were widely 
recognized, and also that external partners recognized the differential skills of internal 
companies, distinguishing between, for instance, Jordan (a secondary competitor) and 
McLaren (a significant innovator) within the MSV cluster. The importance to multinational 
firms of location for access to novel firm-specific skills is supported, but our evidence 
suggests that multinational firms must understand the differences among members of a 
location-tied cluster if they are to benefit from cluster access. 
4.2.4. Proposition 4  
As many of the F1 Teams are satellite operations of the multinational automotive 
manufacturers we are able to explore the concept of ‘within company structures’ and the 
potential they may offer. Ross Brawn, has been technical director for several F1 teams, 
including Ferrari, and in 2009 owner of his own F1 team, Brawn GP. In 1997 Brawn moved 
from the Benetton F1 team, an independent operation located within MSV to Ferrari, owned 
by the Fiat Group and whose operation in Maranello also included a separate organisation to 
design and manufacture road going Ferrari cars: 
 Quality control in motor racing is not as good as I experienced when I came here 
because the quality control was necessary for a road car group, things like quality control at 
your suppliers was new to me.  I knew it existed but we have quality control engineers and, 
I’m not sure what they’re called, but we have people who are working with our suppliers to 
ensure quality all the way through the line(Ross Brawn: Interview) 
Brawn also elaborated on how he had managed to unlock some of the potential of the Fiat 
Group that prior to his arrival had been underutilised: 
  22
 One of the benefits we’ve got from Fiat is a Research Group and Centre Research Fiat 
(CRF) which is an independent part of the organisation.  It’s been a huge asset to us and it 
really wasn’t being used when I came here and we were lucky that [another member of the 
team] had come from there and kept telling me what a wonderful place it was and how we 
should use it and he knew the right buttons to press and the right people to talk to and they’d 
had a little bit of a difficult relationship in the past with CRF but we managed to build it up 
and now it’s a key part of our organisation.  
 Brawn also hinted at some of the potential reasons why these opportunities had not be 
realised in the past: 
 We have a little bit of bureaucracy that comes from being part of a large group and 
that’s frustrating sometimes but you have to accept that as part of the necessity of being part 
of a large group. (Ross Brawn, Interview) 
Revised P4: Knowledge flows will be greater between formal partners and within 
company structures than through informal relationships, but such formal flows can be 
facilitated or inhibited by informal relationships.  
 While most of the discussion of knowledge flows in clusters emphasizes informal 
relationships, uncompensated spillovers, or untraded interdependencies (Zucker et al., 1998; 
Storper, 1995), the experiences of firms and individuals in F1 demonstrate the importance of 
formal relationships, whether alliances, subcontracting, or technology supply contracts.  For 
one thing, formal relationships ensure that accurate and complete component knowledge is 
shared – a concern in the case of informal ties, where rumor and partial revelation are more 
likely.  In cases such as Ferrari deciding to commit to aerodynamics or other system-level 
architectural redefinitions, access to full and complete knowledge seems particularly 
important. However, it is suggested that the above is moderated by the informal relationships 
that exist around the formal knowledge flow. The benefits to external firms of informal ties to 
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members of clusters seem undeniable, but more in support of formal ties that provide fully 
compensated access to complete bodies of knowledge than as substitutes for contractual ties.  
4.2.5. Proposition 5  
In the Formula 1 case we can discern two quite distinctive sets of architectural knowledge 
which give emphasis to different areas of component knowledge. In the nascent Italian 
cluster, we can see a clear focus on engine design as the central element of racing car design, 
an architecture which endures in the history of Ferrari in its vertical cluster. In the British 
cluster, we see first an emphasis on chassis design and weight distribution (to improve the 
handling of the car) which is followed by aerodynamics and the use of composites on the part 
of all competitors. In the later part of the period, we suggest a significant shift in the 
architectural knowledge of Ferrari to provide a more balanced understanding of the areas of 
engine, chassis and aerodynamics. 
 Founder and CEO of Lotus, Colin Chapman’s philosophy of starting the design process 
with the chassis put him in direct contradiction with the Italian F1 teams such as Ferrari, as 
driver Nigel Mansell, who had worked for both observed: "Enzo Ferrari believed that the 
engine was the most important part of the racing car; Colin [Chapman] believed it was the 
chassis." (Mansell, 1996: 126).  
 By 1960, the dominance of the British mid-engine concept was clear. Up to this point, 
Enzo Ferrari had resisted this innovation, maintaining that the engine should always be in 
front of the driver, supporting his position with the often repeated the expression that the ‘ox 
pulls the cart’ (Yates, 1991: 282). However, the evidence from race results was undeniable, 
and Ferrari had to build a lighter mid-engine car, which they did with the Tipo 156 
‘sharknose’to win a further world title in 1961. However Chapman was to take his ideas on 
chassis development a stage further in 1962 with the development of the Lotus 25 monocoque 
chassis, using a fabricated structure rather than a tubular frame to form the chassis - a concept 
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that was quickly adopted by the other teams based in MSV (Lawrence, 1998). The advances 
made in chassis construction by the MSV teams created problems for Ferrari (Nye, 1977), so 
that not until 1964 was the Ferrari 158 was launched with a monocoque type chassis similar to 
the Lotus 25 of 1962, suggesting that Ferrari were two years behind MSV technology.   
 However, the most significant blow to Italian performance was to come with the Ford 
DFV engine. This was first used competitively in a Lotus 49 at the Dutch Grand Prix in 1967 
and caused a sensation by winning its first race (Robson, 1999).  The Ford DFV was created 
by a joint venture between the Ford Motor Company, who funded the project, Cosworth 
Engineering, based in Northampton, UK, who designed and built the engine, and Lotus, based 
in Norfolk, who developed the Lotus 49 using an innovative ‘semi-monocoque’ design where 
the monocoque finished just behind the driver allowing the engine to form a structural part of 
the car thereby reducing weight and maximizing rigidity (Robson, 1999). 
 Although the original intention was for the Ford DFV to be supplied exclusively to 
Lotus, Ford made the decision to make it available to other F1 teams in 1968 (Crombac, 
1986). It dominated F1 through the early seventies and created a significant growth in the 
number of F1 constructors based in MSV. In 1969 and 1973, a car with a Ford DFV engine 
won every Grand Prix, the only occasions in the history of F1 that a single engine totally 
dominated a season.  Effectively, the DFV meant that the MSV teams could focus on chassis 
performance and then acquire a highly competitive engine at relatively low cost (Jenkins et al, 
2009).  
 The late 1970s and early 80s were dominated by a radical shift in F1 car design – 
ground-effect aerodynamics. Aerodynamics had been developed by the MSV teams in an 
effort to increase grip, using aerodynamic devices known as ‘wings’ to increase downforce as 
velocity increased – the opposite to lift created by the wing of an aircraft. Ground-effect took 
things a stage further by using the air flowing under the car to create a low pressure area 
  25
which effectively sucked the car onto the track. This innovation was led once again by Lotus 
(Crombac, 1986; Wright 2001). 
 The Lotus 79 won the 1978 world championship, establishing ground-effect technology 
as a dominant concept in F1 - driver Mario Andretti described the car as being ‘painted on the 
road’ (Crombac, 1986: 284). Many constructors subsequently attempted to imitate the design. 
Quick imitation was practical for many teams, as the majority was using the same engine 
configuration as Lotus [Ford DFV] and therefore had only to concentrate on re-design of the 
chassis. The narrow profile Ford V-8 was ideal for this application. Ferrari’s commitment to 
the Flat-12 engine meant that they were unable to create the narrow chassis profile needed to 
locate the ground-effect venturi passage on either side of the engine, and as a result Ferrari 
became uncompetitive during 1977 and 1978. However Lotus themselves found that their 
competitors within MSV, in particular Williams, had developed a more effective version of 
the design, as summarized by former Lotus Technical Director Martin Ogilvie: 
 …and then of course Williams went and thought about it and then came up with a much 
better car mainly because they realized the importance of the chassis structure in creating 
downforce. (Martin Ogilvie: Interview) 
 The above charts the shift in the architectural knowledge of the UK cluster between a 
focus on chassis to develop to one which integrated both chassis development and 
aerodynamics. During this period (1980s and early 1990s) Ferrari were uncompetitive and so 
embarked on a program of radical change which involved bringing in new leadership and also 
locating the design operation back in Maranello. Ross Brawn, Technical Director of Ferrari, 
summarizes some of the key reasons for Ferrari’ return to success in the early 2000s as: 
 If we had an innovation here it’s the fact that we combine the engine and the chassis 
together as one whole but we apply that principle to all areas of the car with the electronics, 
the engine, the chassis, the aerodynamics, the structure, it all had to be a whole there was no 
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point in having one area very strong and the other area weakA Ferrari is a Ferrari, it’s not 
an engine, it’s not a chassis, it’s not an aero package, it’s a Ferrari. (Ross Brawn: Interview). 
 This integrated approach to car design allowed Ferrari to dominate F1 up until 2004, at 
which point two MSV based teams, Renault and McLaren, were starting to make inroads by 
following the Ferrari approach of integrating engine, chassis and aerodynamics development. 
Both of these teams had their own dedicated engine operations. McLaren used the Ilmor 
operation which subsequently became wholly owned by Mercedes Benz and renamed 
Mercedes Benz High Performance Engines. Renault F1 engines were designed and 
manufactured at Viry-Châtillon near Paris, however a small engine design team were also co-
located at their main F1 design and assembly operation at Enstone in Oxfordshire in order to 
ensure that the design process was as integrated as possible. The competition among these 
three teams continued to the end of the period, with Ferrari securing the constructors 
championship in both 2007 and 2008.  
Revised P5: Competing firms in the same cluster can use unique firm-specific 
architectural knowledge to build competitive advantage while applying cluster-specific 
knowledge. External or multinational firms with very different architectural knowledge 
are slower to integrate knowledge developed in clusters. 
 In the case of Formula 1, we see this phenomenon in several situations. In particular, 
Lotus was the source of the innovations such as semi-monocoque construction, ground-effect 
aerodynamics and the use of composite materials. However, Lotus found only limited 
competitive success from these innovations as other MSV firms quickly understood and 
incorporated them into their own repertoires of capabilities. Ferrari, the sole surviving Italian 
firm after 1957, was slow to recognize the potential value of each of these innovations, 
largely because its engine-focused architectural understanding of racing success simply failed 
to comprehend the potential value of chassis and body-related innovations. We might also 
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consider that the loss of its regional competitors had reduced the direct pressure on Ferrari to 
innovate during this period, limiting its immediate incentive for disruptive architectural 
change (Maskell, 2001).  For multinational firms seeking cluster-based knowledge, this 
insight suggests a patient approach to strategic re-combinations of knowledge (Kogut and 
Zander, 1992), as full understanding of captured knowledge is an involved and difficult 
process. 
5. Conclusions 
Our examination of the evolutionary patterns in the performance of clusters, networks and 
firms has provided a further refinement of some of the potential relationships that both 
support and change the nature of clusters and the opportunities available for multinational 
firms when choosing the location of new operations. The revisions to our initial propositions 
suggest that there is a symbiotic relationship between clusters and firms’ external networks. 
These relationships allow the development of new knowledge and capabilities within clusters, 
but also allow external or multinational firms to access such capabilities and to develop their 
own distinctive resource combinations that may allow them to outperform the cluster-based 
firms.  
 Multinational firms, therefore, should consider current knowledge stocks to establish 
whether location within a cluster will bring greater benefit due to knowledge inflows than the 
outflows which could shorten the potential time period of a competitive advantage. 
However, linkages between cluster based and external firms are an inherent part of the 
dynamics of the. Multinational entrants to clusters benefit the clusters as well as 
themselves.There may be strong reasons which relate to protecting proprietary knowledge or 
to ensuring cultural fit (as was the case with BMW and Sauber) which means MNEs choose 
not to locate within a cluster. Also, when establishing ties to cluster members, multinational 
firms must recognize that these are not homogenous – only a few of the cluster members are 
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likely to be the real innovators.Although at a macro level the importance of formal structures 
to enhance knowledge flow may be regarded as self-evident, the Ferrari experience suggests 
that formal relationships may only become powerful sources of knowledge if the appropriate 
informal structures and relationships are in place. This suggests that competitive advantage at 
the MNE level may be dependent on the ability to support formal structures with informal 
mechanisms and relationships to enhance such processes. 
 Finally, we suggest that a key part of the challenge for MNEs in managing knowledge 
flows within clusters is ensuring that their architectural knowledge is sufficiently able to 
connect with cluster level knowledge and thereby benefit from the inflows from spillovers, 
but also sufficiently distinctive and private to ensure that some level of competitive advantage 
can be achieved. This is an important and subtle distinction and one which warrants further 
exploration in other technological sectors to define how such a balance can be achieved and 
maintained. 
 Our study has distinct limitations. It addresses a single industry, one that is in many 
ways unique, and our propositions need to be applied in other contexts. It is based on 
combining varying types of data in the case analysis, with the focus on developing theoretical 
frameworks rather than testing them. Cross-industry quantitative empirical studies of 
international samples of clusters, firms and networks are needed to confirm or deny fully our 
propositions.  However, this unique context does allow us to consider a wide range of data 
and phenomena at both the cluster and firm level of analysis, such a rich description of a 
particular situation being particularly valuable for theory development. 
 Our study suggests that multinational firms can realistically hope to benefit from 
uprooting, transporting, and recombining even architectural knowledge from within clusters – 
but only with difficulty and awareness of the pitfalls and the prospects. The value to a firm 
based in one location of incorporating ideas and innovations from another location, 
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particularly a location that provides the shared, integrated knowledge of a cluster, can be very 
high, especially when the core architectural knowledge being imported is more distinctive. 
However, in F1, as in other cases, it seems that the greater the potential value, the greater the 
difficulty of transmitting knowledge from a firm or cluster in one place to a firm or cluster in 
another place.  Seeking advantage by seeking exotic knowledge in far-flung locations is a 
strategy that is being proposed more often for multinational, but should be subject to careful 
scrutiny before being implemented – its costs are high and its benefits seem uncertain from 
what we observe in the world of Formula 1 racing. 
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Figure 1: Location of main Formula One Entrants, 1950 
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Figure 2: Location of Formula One Entrants, 2008 
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Figure 3:  
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